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Reinforcement learning (RL) models have been influential in understanding many aspects
of basal ganglia function, from reward prediction to action selection. Time plays an
important role in these models, but there is still no theoretical consensus about what kind
of time representation is used by the basal ganglia. We review several theoretical accounts
and their supporting evidence. We then discuss the relationship between RL models and
the timing mechanisms that have been attributed to the basal ganglia. We hypothesize that
a single computational system may underlie both RL and interval timing—the perception
of duration in the range of seconds to hours. This hypothesis, which extends earlier
models by incorporating a time-sensitive action selection mechanism, may have important
implications for understanding disorders like Parkinson’s disease in which both decision
making and timing are impaired.
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INTRODUCTION
Computational models of reinforcement learning (RL) have had
a profound influence on the contemporary understanding of
the basal ganglia (Joel et al., 2002; Cohen and Frank, 2009).
The central claim of these models is that the basal ganglia are
organized to support prediction, learning and optimization of
long-term reward. While this claim is now widely accepted,
RL models have had little to say about the extensive research
implicating the basal ganglia in interval timing—the percep-
tion of duration in the range of seconds to hours (Buhusi
and Meck, 2005; Jones and Jahanshahi, 2009; Merchant et al.,
2013). However, this is not to say that time is ignored by
these models—on the contrary, time representation has been
a pivotal issue in RL theory, particularly with regard to the
role of dopamine (Suri and Schultz, 1999; Daw et al., 2006;
Ludvig et al., 2008; Nakahara and Kaveri, 2010; Rivest et al.,
2010).
In this review, we attempt a provisional synthesis of research
on RL and interval timing in the basal ganglia. We begin by
briefly reviewing RL models of the basal ganglia, with a focus
on how they represent time. We then summarize the key data
linking the basal ganglia with interval timing, drawing connec-
tions between computational approaches to timing and their
relationship to RL models. Our central thesis is that by incor-
porating a time-sensitive action selection mechanism into RL
models, a single computational system can support both RL
and interval timing. This unified view leads to a coherent inter-
pretation of decision making and timing deficits in Parkinson’s
disease.
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING MODELS OF THE BASAL
GANGLIA
RL models characterize animals as agents that seek to maximize
future reward (for reviews, see Maia, 2009; Niv, 2009; Ludvig
et al., 2011). To do so, animals are assumed to generate a pre-
diction of future reward and select actions according to a policy
that maximizes that reward. More formally, suppose that at time
t an agent occupies a state st (e.g., the agent’s location or the sur-
rounding stimuli) and receives a reward rt . The agent’s goal is to
predict the expected discounted future return, or value, of visiting
a sequence of states starting in state st (Sutton and Barto, 1998):
V(St) = E
[∑
k= 0
γkrt + k
]
, (1)
where γ is a parameter that discounts distal rewards relative
to proximal rewards, and E denotes an average over possibly
stochastic sequences of states and rewards.
Typically, a state st is described by a set of D features,
{xt (1) , . . . , xt (D)}, encoding sensory and cognitive aspects of
an animal’s current experience. Given this state representation,
the value can be approximated by a weighted combination of the
features:
Vˆ (st) =
∑
d
wt (d) xt (d)
where Vˆ is an estimate of the true value V. According to RL mod-
els of the basal ganglia, these features are represented by cortical
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2014 | Volume 7 | Article 194 | 1
COMPUTATIONAL NEUROSCIENCE
Gershman et al. Time and reinforcement learning in the basal ganglia
inputs to the striatum, with the striatum itself encoding the esti-
mated value (Maia, 2009; Niv, 2009; Ludvig et al., 2011). The
strengths of these corticostriatal synapses are represented by a set
of weights {wt (1) , . . . ,wt (D)}.
These weights can be learned through a simple algorithm
known as temporal-difference (TD) learning, which adjusts the
weights on each time step based on the difference between
received and predicted reward:
wt + 1 (d) = wt (d) + αδt et (d) ,
where α is a learning rate and δt is a prediction error defined as:
δt = rt + γVˆ (st+1) − Vˆ (st) .
The eligibility trace et(d) is updated according to:
et + 1 (d) = γλet (d) + xt(d),
where λ is a decay parameter that determines the plasticity win-
dow of recent stimuli. The TD algorithm is a computationally
efficient method that is known to converge to the true value
function [see Equation (1) above] with enough experience and
adequate features (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
The importance of this algorithm to neuroscience lies in the
fact that the firing of midbrain dopamine neurons conforms
remarkably well to the theoretical prediction error (Houk et al.,
1995; Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997; though see
Redgrave et al., 2008 for a critique). For example, dopamine neu-
rons increase their firing upon the delivery of an unexpected
reward and pause when an expected reward is omitted (Schultz
et al., 1997). The role of prediction errors in learning is supported
by the observation that plasticity at corticostriatal synapses is
gated by dopamine (Reynolds andWickens, 2002; Steinberg et al.,
2013), as well as a large body of behavioral evidence (Rescorla and
Wagner, 1972; Sutton and Barto, 1990; Ludvig et al., 2012).
A fundamental question facing RL models is the choice of
feature representation. Early applications of TD learning to the
dopamine system assumed what is known as the complete serial
compound (CSC; Moore et al., 1989; Sutton and Barto, 1990;
Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997), which represents every
time step following stimulus onset as a separate feature. Thus, the
first feature has a value of 1 for the first time step and 0 for all
other time steps, the second feature has a value of 1 for the sec-
ond time step and 0 for all other time steps, and so on. This CSC
representation assumes a perfect clock, whereby the brain always
knows exactly how many time steps have elapsed since stimulus
onset.
The CSC is effective at capturing several salient aspects of the
dopamine response to cued reward. A number of authors (e.g.,
Daw et al., 2006; Ludvig et al., 2008), however, have pointed out
aspects of the dopamine response that appear inconsistent with
the CSC. For example, the CSC predicts a large, punctate negative
prediction error when an expected reward is omitted; the actual
decrease in dopamine response is relatively small and temporally
extended (Schultz et al., 1997; Bayer et al., 2007). Another prob-
lem with the CSC is that it predicts a large negative prediction
FIGURE 1 | (A) Example microstimuli. Each microstimulus acts as a
dynamic feature, going up and then coming back down with a
characteristic time course after the stimulus. (B) Fraction of medium
spiny neurons recorded in the putamen with a significant response
(both increases and decreases in firing rate) to cue events. In this task,
a visual cue (fractal image) is presented at time 0, followed by an
outcome (food, air puff, or neutral sound) 2 s later. Clusters correspond
to groups of neurons with similar response profiles (see Adler et al.,
2012 for details). Time courses are shown separately for cues that
predict rewarding (food), aversive (air puff), or neutral (sound)
outcomes. Note the similarity in the population response to the
postulated time course of the theoretical microstimuli. Figure adapted
from Adler et al. (2012) with permission from the publisher.
error at the usual reward delivery time when a reward is delivered
early. Contrary to this prediction, Hollerman and Schultz (1998)
found that early reward evoked a large response immediately after
the unexpected reward, but showed little change from baseline at
the usual reward delivery time.
It is possible that these mismatches between theory and data
reflect problems with a number of different theoretical assump-
tions. Indeed, several theoretical assumptions have been ques-
tioned by recent research (see Niv, 2009). We focus here on
alternative time representations as one potential response to the
findings mentioned above.
We will discuss two of these alternatives (see also Suri and
Schultz, 1999; Nakahara and Kaveri, 2010; Rivest et al., 2010):
(1) the microstimulus representation and (2) states with vari-
able durations (a semi-Markov formalism) and only partial
observability. For the former, Ludvig et al. (2008) proposed
that when a stimulus is presented, it leaves a slowly decay-
ing memory trace, which is encoded by a series of temporal
receptive fields. Each feature (or “microstimulus”) xt(d) rep-
resents the proximity between the trace and the center of the
receptive field, producing a spectrum of features that vary
with time, as illustrated in Figure 1A. Specifically, Ludvig et al.
endowed each stimulus with microstimuli of the following
form:
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xt(d) = yt√
σ2
exp
⎛
⎜⎝−
(
yt − dD
)2
2σ2
⎞
⎟⎠
where D is the number of microstimuli, σ2 controls the width of
each receptive field, and yt is the stimulus trace strength, which
was set to 1 at stimulus onset and decreased exponentially with a
decay rate of 0.985 per time step. Both cues and rewards elicit their
own set of microstimuli. This feature representation is plugged
into the TD learning equations described above.
Themicrostimulus representation is a temporally smeared ver-
sion of the CSC: whereas in the CSC each feature encodes a
single time point, in the microstimulus representation each fea-
ture encodes a temporal range (see also Grossberg and Schmajuk,
1989; Machado, 1997). With the CSC, as time elapses after a
stimulus, there is one, unique feature active at each time point.
Learned weights for that time point therefore all accrue to that
one feature. In contrast, at any time point, a subset of the micros-
timuli is differentially activated. These serve as the features that
can be used to generate a prediction of upcoming reward (values).
Note how the temporal precision of the microstimuli decreases
with time following stimulus onset, so that later microstimuli are
more dispersed than earlier microstimuli.
Recent data from Adler et al. (2012) have provided direct
evidence for microstimuli in the basal ganglia (Figure 1B).
Recording from the putamen while a monkey was engaged in a
classical conditioning task, Adler et al. found clusters of medium
spiny neurons with distinct post-stimulus time courses (for both
cues and outcomes). As postulated by Ludvig et al. (2008), the
peak response time varied across clusters, with long latency
peaks (i.e., late microstimuli) associated with greater disper-
sion. Recording from the caudate nucleus, Jin et al. (2009) also
found clusters of neurons that encode time-stamps of different
events. These neurons carry sufficient information to decode time
from the population response. Early time points are decodable
with higher fidelity compared to late time points, as would be
expected if the dispersion of temporal receptive fields increases
with latency.
A different solution to the limitations of the CSC was sug-
gested by Daw et al. (2006). They proposed that dopaminergic
prediction errors reflect a state space that is partially observable
and semi-Markov. The partial-observability assumption means
that the underlying state is inferred from sensory data (cues and
rewards), rather than using the features as a proxy for the state.
Thus, prediction errors are computed with respect to a belief state,
a set of features encoding the probabilistic inference about the
hidden state. The semi-Markov assumption means that each state
is occupied for a random amount of time before transitioning. In
the simulations of Daw et al. (2006), only two states were postu-
lated: an interstimulus interval (ISI) state and an intertrial interval
(ITI) state. Rewards are delivered upon transition from the ISI to
the ITI state, and cues occur upon transition from the ITI to the
ISI state. The learning rule in this model is more complex than
the standard TD learning rule [which is used by the Ludvig et al.
(2008) model]; however, the core idea of learning from prediction
errors is preserved in this model.
It is instructive to compare how these two models account for
the data on early reward presented by Hollerman and Schultz
(1998). In the Ludvig et al. (2008) model, the weights for all the
microstimuli are updated after every time step: the late micros-
timuli associated with the cue (i.e., those centered around the
time of reward delivery) accrue positive weights, even after the
time of reward delivery (a consequence of the temporal smear-
ing). These post-reward positive predictions generate a negative
prediction error, causing the early microstimuli associated with
the reward to accrue negative weights. When reward is pre-
sented early, the net prediction is close to zero, because the
positive weights on the late cue microstimuli compete with the
negative weights on the early reward microstimuli. This interac-
tion produces a negligible negative prediction error, consistent
with the data of Hollerman and Schultz (1998). The account
of Daw et al. (2006) is conceptually different: when reward
is presented early, the model infers that a transition to the
ITI state has occurred early, and consequently no reward is
expected.
Thus far, we have discussed time representations in the ser-
vice of RL and their implications for the timing of the dopamine
response during conditioning. What do RL models have to say
about interval timing per se? We will argue below that these are
not really separate problems: interval timing tasks can be viewed
fundamentally as RL tasks. Concomitantly, the role of dopamine
and the basal ganglia in interval timing can be understood in
terms of their computational contributions to RL. To elaborate
this argument, we need to first review some of the relevant theory
and data linking interval timing with the basal ganglia.
TIME REPRESENTATION IN THE BASAL GANGLIA: DATA
AND THEORY
The role of the basal ganglia and dopamine in interval timing has
been studied most extensively in the context of two procedures:
the peak procedure (Catania, 1970; Roberts, 1981) and the bisec-
tion procedure (Church and Deluty, 1977). The peak procedure
consists of two trial types: on fixed-interval trials, the subject is
rewarded if a response is made after a fixed duration following
cue presentation. On probe trials, the cue duration is extended,
and no reward is delivered for responding. Figure 2A shows a typ-
ical response curve on probe trials: on average, the response rate
peaks around the time of food presentation (20 or 40 s in the fig-
ure) is ordinarily available and then decreases. The peak time (a
measure of the animal’s interval estimate) is the time at which the
response rate is maximal.
The other two curves in Figure 2A illustrate the standard find-
ing that drugs (or genetic manipulations) that increase dopamine
transmission, such as methamphetamine, shift the response curve
leftward (Maricq et al., 1981;Matell et al., 2004, 2006; Cheng et al.,
2007; Balci et al., 2010), whereas drugs that decrease dopamine
transmission shift the response curve rightward (Drew et al.,
2003; Macdonald and Meck, 2005).
In the bisection procedure, subjects are trained to respond
differentially to short and long duration cues. Unreinforced
probe trials with cue durations between these two extremes are
occasionally presented. On these trials, typically, a psychometric
curve is produced with greater selection of the long option (i.e.,
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FIGURE 2 | Effects of methamphetamine on timing in (A) the peak
procedure and (B) the bisection procedure in rats. Each curve in (A)
represents response rate as a function of time, where time 0 corresponds
to the trial onset. The methamphetamine curve corresponds to sessions in
which rats were injected with methamphetamine; the baseline curve
corresponds to sessions in which rats did not receive an injection. Each
curve in (B) represents the proportion of trials on which the rat chose the
“long” option as a function of probe cue duration. The saline curve
corresponds to sessions in which the rat received a saline injection. In both
procedures, methamphetamine leads to overestimation of the elapsing
interval, producing early responding in the peak procedure and more “long”
responses in the bisection procedure. Figure replotted from Maricq et al.
(1981).
the option reinforced following long duration cues) with longer
probes and greater selection of the short option with shorter
probes and a gradual shift between the two (see Figure 2B). The
indifference point or point of subjective equality is typically close
to the geometric mean of the two anchor durations (Church and
Deluty, 1977). Similar to the peak procedure, in the bisection pro-
cedure, Figure 2B shows how dopamine agonists usually produce
a leftward shift in the psychometric curve—i.e., more “short”
responses, whereas dopamine antagonists produce the opposite
pattern (Maricq et al., 1981; Maricq and Church, 1983; Meck,
1986; Cheng et al., 2007). Under some circumstances, however,
dopamine agonists induce temporal dysregulation with an overall
flattening of the response curve and no shift in preference or peak
times (e.g., Odum et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2005; Balci et al.,
2008).
The most influential interpretation of these findings draws
upon the class of pacemaker-accumulator models (Gibbon et al.,
1997), according to which a pacemaker (an “internal clock”)
emits pulses that are accumulated by a counter to form a repre-
sentation of subjective time intervals. The neurobiological imple-
mentation of this scheme might rely on populations of oscillating
neurons (Miall, 1989; Matell and Meck, 2004), integration of
ramping neural activity (Leon and Shadlen, 2003; Simen et al.,
2011), or intrinsic dynamics of a recurrent network (Buonomano
and Laje, 2010). Independent of the neural implementation, the
idea is that drugs that increase dopamine speed up the internal
clock, while drugs that decrease dopamine slow the internal clock
down.
This interpretation is generally consistent with the findings
from studies of patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD), who
have chronically low striatal dopamine levels. When off medica-
tion, these patients tend to underestimate the length of temporal
intervals in verbal estimation tasks; dopaminergic medication
alleviates this underestimation (Pastor et al., 1992; Lange et al.,
1995). It should be noted, however, that some studies have found
normal time perception in PD (Malapani et al., 1998; Spencer and
Ivry, 2005; Wearden et al., 2008), possibly due to variations in
disease severity (Artieda et al., 1992).
Pacemaker-accumulator models have been criticized on a
number of grounds, such as lack of parsimony, implausible
neurophysiological assumptions, and incorrect behavioral predic-
tions (Staddon and Higa, 1999, 2006; Matell and Meck, 2004;
Simen et al., 2013). Moreover, while the pharmacological data are
generally consistent with the idea that dopamine modulates the
speed of the internal clock, these data may also be consistent with
other interpretations. One important alternative is the class of
“distributed elements” models, which postulate a representation
of time that is distributed over a set of elements; these elements
come in various flavors, such as “behavioral states” (Machado,
1997), a cascade of leaky integrators (Staddon and Higa, 1999,
2006; Shankar and Howard, 2012), or spectral traces (Grossberg
and Schmajuk, 1989). The effects of dopaminergic drugs might be
explicable in terms of systematic changes in the pattern of activity
across the distributed elements (see, for example, Grossberg and
Schmajuk, 1989).
In fact, the microstimulus model of Ludvig et al. (2008) can
be viewed as a distributed elements model embedded within
the machinery of RL. This connection suggests a more ambi-
tious theoretical synthesis: can we understand the behavioral
and neurophysiological characteristics of interval timing in terms
of RL?
TOWARD A UNIFIED MODEL OF REINFORCEMENT
LEARNING AND TIMING
One suggestive piece of evidence for how RL models and inter-
val timing can be integrated comes from the study of Fiorillo
et al. (2008); (see also Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008). They trained
monkeys on a variation of the peak procedure with classical con-
tingencies (i.e., water was delivered independent of responding)
while recording from dopamine neurons in the substantia nigra
and ventral tegmental area with five different intervals span-
ning from 1 to 16 s. As shown in Figure 3A, they found that the
dopamine response to the reward increased with the interval, and
the dopamine response to the cue decreased with the interval.
Whereas the response to the cue can be explained in terms
of temporal discounting, the response to the reward should not
(according to the CSC representation) depend on the cue-reward
interval. The perfect timing inherent in the CSC representation
means that the reward can be equally well predicted at all time
points. Thus, there should be no reward-prediction error, and
no phasic dopamine response, at the time of reward regardless of
the cue-reward interval. Alternatively, the dopamine response to
reward can be understood as reflecting increasing uncertainty in
the temporal prediction. Figure 3B shows how, using the micros-
timulus TD model as defined as in Ludvig et al. (2008), there
is indeed an increase in the simulated reward prediction error
as a function of interval. In the model, with longer intervals,
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Firing rates of dopamine neurons in monkeys to cues and
rewards as a function of cue-reward interval duration. Adapted from Fiorillo
et al. (2008) with permission from the publisher. (B) Prediction errors to the
reward and cue as a function of the interval duration for the microstimulus
model. The simulations of the microstimulus model were run for 100 trials
and used the same parameters specified in Ludvig et al. (2008): λ = 0.95,
α = 0.01, γ = 0.98, D = 50, σ = 0.08. We treated 20 time steps as a unit of
1 s, and each trial was separated by an interval of 500 time steps. Note the
logarithmic scale on the x-axis.
the reward predictions are less temporally precise, and greater
prediction errors persist upon reward receipt.
Interval timing procedures, such as the peak procedure, add an
additional nuance to this problem by introducing instrumental
contingencies. Animals must now not only predict the timing of
reward, but also learn when to respond. To analyze this problem
in terms of RL, we need to augment the framework introduced
earlier to have actions. There are various ways to accomplish
this (see Sutton and Barto, 1998). The Actor-Critic architec-
ture (Houk et al., 1995; Joel et al., 2002) is one of the earliest
and most influential approaches; it postulates a separate “actor”
mechanism that probabilistically chooses an action at given the
current state st . The action probabilities p(st |at) ∝ exp{f (st |at)}
are updated according to:
f (st |at) ← f (st |at) + ηδt[1 − p(st |at)],
where η is a learning rate parameter and δt is the is the prediction
error defined earlier. The value estimation system plays the role of
a “critic” that teaches the actor how to modify its action selection
probabilities so as to reduce prediction errors.
When combined with the microstimulus representation, the
actor-critic architecture naturally gives rise to timing behavior: in
the peak procedure, on average, responding will tend to increase
toward the expected reward time and decrease thereafter (see
Figure 2). Importantly, the late microstimuli are less tempo-
rally precise than the early microstimuli, in the sense that their
responses are more dispersed over time. As a consequence, credit
for late rewards is assigned to a larger number of microstimuli.
Under the assumption that response rate is proportion to pre-
dicted value, this dispersion of credit causes the timing of actions
to be more spread out around the time of reward as the length
of the interval increases, one of the central empirical regular-
ities in timing behavior (Gibbon, 1977; see also Ludvig et al.,
2012 for an exploration of this property in classical condition-
ing). As described above, an analog of this property has also been
observed in the firing of midbrain dopamine neurons: response
to reward increases linearly with the logarithm of the stimulus-
reward interval, consistent with the idea that prediction errors are
being computed with respect to a value signal whose temporal
precision decreases over time (Fiorillo et al., 2008). To the best of
our knowledge, pacemaker-accumulator models cannot account
for the results presented in Figure 3, because they do not have
reward-prediction errors in their machinery. Instead, they collect
a distribution of past cue-reward intervals and draw from that dis-
tribution to create an estimate of the time to reward (e.g., Gibbon
et al., 1984).
The partially observable semi-Markov model of Daw et al.
(2006) can account for the findings of Fiorillo et al. (2008), but
this account deviates from the normative RL framework. Daw
et al. use an external timing signal with “scalar noise” (cf. Gibbon
et al., 1984), implemented by adding Gaussian noise to the timing
signal with standard deviation proportional to the interval. Scalar
noise induces larger-magnitude prediction errors with increasing
delays. However, these prediction errors are symmetric around 0
and hence cancel out on average. To account for the effects of cue-
reward interval on the dopamine response, Daw et al. assume that
negative prediction errors are rectified (see Bayer and Glimcher,
2005), resulting in a positive skew of the prediction error distribu-
tion. Figure 4 shows how this asymmetric rectification results in
average prediction errors that are increasingly positive for longer
intervals. Note that rectification is not an intrinsic part of the RL
framework, and in fact compromises the convergence of TD to
the true value function. One potential solution to this problem
is to posit a separate physiological channel for the signaling of
negative prediction errors, possibly via serotonergic activity (Daw
et al., 2002).
The microstimulus actor-critic model can also explain the
effects of dopamine manipulations and Parkinson’s disease. The
key additional assumption is that early microstimuli (but not
later ones) are primarily represented by the striatum. Timing in
the milliseconds to seconds range depends on D2 receptors in
the dorsal striatum (Rammsayer, 1993; Coull et al., 2011), sug-
gesting that this region represents early microstimuli (whereas
late microstimuli may be represented by other neural substrates,
such as the hippocampus; see Ludvig et al., 2009). Because the
post-synaptic effect of dopamine at D2 receptors is inhibitory,
D2 receptor antagonists increase the firing of striatal neurons
expressing D2 receptors, which mainly occur in the indirect or
“NoGo” pathway and exert a suppressive influence on striatal
output (Gerfen, 1992). Thus, the ultimate effect of D2 receptor
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FIGURE 4 | (A) The distribution of prediction errors in the semi-Markov TD
model (Daw et al., 2006) for three logarithmically spaced cue-reward
interval durations (short, medium, long). The timing signal is corrupted by
zero-mean Gaussian noise with standard deviation proportional to the
interval duration. (B) The average prediction error under each distribution. A
symmetric prediction error distribution implies that the average prediction
error is invariant to the interval duration. (C,D) Same format as panels A and
B, but where the prediction error distribution is rectified slightly below 0.
This asymmetric distribution produces average prediction errors that scale
approximately linearly with the log interval duration.
antagonists is to reduce striatal output, thereby attenuating the
influence of early microstimuli on behavior. As a result, predic-
tions of the upcoming reward will be biased later, and responses
will occur later than usual (e.g., in the peak procedure). This fits
with the observation that the rightward shift (overestimation)
of estimated time following dopamine antagonist administration
is proportional to the drug’s binding affinity for D2 receptors
(Meck, 1986). In contrast, dopamine agonists lead to a selective
enhancement of the early microstimuli, producing earlier than
usual responding (see Figure 2A).
A similar line of reasoning can explain some of the timing
deficits in Parkinson’s disease. The nigrostriatal pathway (the
main source of dopamine to the dorsal striatum) is compromised
in Parkinson’s disease, resulting in reduced striatal dopamine lev-
els. Because D2 receptors have a higher affinity for dopamine,
Parkinson’s disease leads to the predominance of D2-mediated
activity and hence reduced striatal output (Wiecki and Frank,
2010). Our model thus predicts a rightward shift of estimated
time, as is often observed experimentally (see above).
The linking of early microstimuli with the striatum in the
model also leads to the prediction that low striatal dopamine
levels will result in poorer learning of fast responses (which
depend on the early microstimuli). In addition, responding will
in general be slowed because the learned weights to the early
microstimuli will be weak relative to those of late microstimuli.
As a result, our model clearly predicts poorer learning of fast
responses in Parkinson’s disease. A study of temporal decision
making in Parkinson’s patients fits with this prediction (Moustafa
et al., 2008). Patients were trained to respond at different latencies
to a set of cues, with slow responses yielding more reward in an
“increasing expected value” (IEV) condition and fast responses
yielding more reward in a “decreasing expected value” (DEV)
condition. It was found that the performance of medicated
patients was better in the DEV condition, while performance of
non-medicated patients was better in the IEV condition. If non-
medicated patients have a paucity of short-timescale microstimuli
(due to low striatal dopamine levels), then the model correctly
anticipates that these patients will be impaired at learning about
early events relative to later events.
Recently, Foerde et al. (2013) found that Parkinson’s patients
are impaired in learning from immediate, but not delayed, feed-
back in a probabilistic decision making task. This finding is also
consistent with the idea that these patients lack a representa-
tional substrate for early post-stimulus events. Interestingly, they
also found that patients with lesions of the medial temporal lobe
show the opposite pattern, possibly indicating that this region
(and in particular the hippocampus) is important for represent-
ing late microstimuli, as was suggested earlier by Ludvig et al.
(2009). An alternative possibility is that the striatum and hip-
pocampus both represent early and late microstimuli, but the
stimulus trace decays more quickly in the striatum than in the
hippocampus (Bornstein andDaw, 2012), which would produce a
more graded segregation of temporal sensitivity between the two
regions.
CONCLUSION
Timing and RL have for the most part been studied separately,
giving rise to largely non-overlapping computational models.
We have argued here, however, that these models do in fact
share some important commonalities and reconciling them may
provide a unified explanation of many behavioral and neural phe-
nomena. While in this brief review we have only sketched such
a synthesis, our goal is to plant the seeds for future theoretical
unification.
One open question concerns how to reconcile the disparate
theoretical ideas about time representation that were described
in this paper. Our synthesis proposed a central role for a dis-
tributed elements representation of time such as the microstimuli
of Ludvig et al. (2008). Could a representation deriving from the
semi-Markov or pacemaker-accumulator models be used instead?
This may be possible, but there are several reasons to prefer
the microstimulus representation. First, microstimuli lend them-
selves naturally to the linear function approximation architecture
that has been widely used in RL models of the basal ganglia.
In contrast, the semi-Markov model requires additional com-
putational machinery, and it is not obvious how to incorporate
the pacemaker-accumulator model into RL theory. Second, the
semi-Markov model accounts for the relationship between tem-
poral precision and interval length at the expense of deviating
from the normative RL framework. Third, as we noted earlier,
pacemaker-accumulator models have a number of other weak-
nesses (see Staddon and Higa, 1999, 2006; Matell andMeck, 2004;
Simen et al., 2013), such as lack of parsimony, implausible neuro-
physiological assumptions, and incorrect behavioral predictions.
Nonetheless, it will be interesting to explore what aspects of these
models can be successfully incorporated into the next generation
of RL models.
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